Ali Zarifhonarvar,; Mehdi Feizi,; , Mohammad Taher Ahmadi Shadmehri
Abstract
According to different economists such as Baumol and Acemoglu, entrepreneurship may manifest itself in a community productively and non-productively. Rewards structure and wealth distributions are effective factors in investment decisions and economic growth. All economies worldwide are suffering from ...
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According to different economists such as Baumol and Acemoglu, entrepreneurship may manifest itself in a community productively and non-productively. Rewards structure and wealth distributions are effective factors in investment decisions and economic growth. All economies worldwide are suffering from a degree of corruption, which enables rent-seekers to take possession of a part of entrepreneurs’ shares and it could be a sign of violation of property rights. This research presents a theoretical model for the relationship of investment decisions with rent-seekers probability and bribe rate; it is shown that economies may be placed in a multiple equilibria state with low and high rentier rates. The study also found that both the entrepreneurial investment level and income, and rent-seekers income (share), are negatively correlated with the likelihood of an entrepreneur encountering a rent-seeker. In fact, rent-seeking as a symbol of violation of property rights not only decreases the investment level, but also has a negative effect on the rent-seekers payoff. An extended model shows that considering the open economy and the possibility of immigration, it becomes clear that high bribe rates increase the immigration motivation, and greater difference in the rentier rates of the two countries raises the immigration likelihood.
Mehdi Feizi
Abstract
In general compliance with competition law and deterrence of forming or joining any anti-competitive conducts are achieved through the deterrent effects of penalties. Nevertheless, full compliance behavior is not observed from all firms. In this paper, we study dynamic enforcement of competition law ...
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In general compliance with competition law and deterrence of forming or joining any anti-competitive conducts are achieved through the deterrent effects of penalties. Nevertheless, full compliance behavior is not observed from all firms. In this paper, we study dynamic enforcement of competition law in a dynamic model of an antitrust and firms and analyze via differential games how efficient is this law. We show that the current monetary penalty legislation seems not to be as efficient in the sense that full compliance behavior does not arise as the long-run steady-state equilibrium of the model. Furthermore, we suggest a penalty regime that depends both on the infringement's duration and the rate of law enforcement and could totally prevent collusion. This regime is efficient from the point of view of the possibility of complete deterrence of cartel formation in long-run and there is a possibility to achieve the socially desirable outcome, i.e. the outcome with no anti-competitive conduct.
